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This research analyses the California Solar Initiative (CSI) Program data to 
identify and describe peer effects and price elasticity to adoption affecting the patterns of 
residential PV adoption. Descriptive statistics and adoption trends are analyzed to explore 
the impacts of peer effects and third-party owned system on the diffusion of residential 
solar PV in California. As the residential solar PV technology is still in an early stage of 
market formation, understanding the patterns of adoption in relatively more mature 
market can have broad implications for wider diffusion of the technology at the national 
level. 
In the first part of the thesis, I build an econometric model to estimate the 
influence of system cost and peer effects on the rate of diffusion at the zip code-level. 
The results reveal significant and positive installed base effects in the rate of future 
adoption. These results provide support to the hypothesis that peer effects help accelerate 
the adoption of new technologies. The cost-to-customer reduction is negative and 
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significant at the state level. The impact of installed base in inducing new adoption is 
larger in zip codes with higher overall adoptions. 
The second part of the thesis presents trends in installation and choice of system 
capacity of major adoption clusters in California and analyzes the spread of third-party 
owned systems. Evidence from major adoption clusters in California has shown that 
growth in leasing adoption exhibits exponential characteristics while growth of customer 
owned system shows strongly linear feature. This suggests that third-party owned 
systems play a role in expanding the solar PV market to a significantly large population, 
especially given that this business would significantly reduces information cost 
associated with PV adoption. 
These results offer direct policy and marketing insights that would be useful in 
speeding up the diffusion of residential PV. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 MOTIVATIONS 
 The U.S. grid-tied photovoltaic (PV) capacity from the residential sector has 
increased from under 10 MW to over 150 MW between 2001 and 2009 (SEIA 2010). The 
growth, however, has been limited to relatively few states such as California, New Jersey, 
Arizona, and Colorado. The locations of U.S. residential PV markets exhibit cluster 
characteristics where, at the regional level, states with some combination of high 
electricity prices, good solar resources, and strong financial incentive schemes have a 
larger share of adopters relative to other states.  There is a high disparity in installed 
capacity between the leading states and the rest of the country.  According to the 
California Solar Statistics, the total installed capacity for residential PV system in that 
state is over 315 MW (CSI 2012) while states such as Nebraska, Virginia, and Kansas 
have less than 0.1 MW in total installed capacity (EERE 2010). 
The disparity in installed capacity among the states can generally be explained by 
the availability of financial incentives programs and renewable energy policies in various 
states.  However, clustering of adopters can also be seen at a localized level within the 
states and utility service territories.  Evidence from the California Solar Initiative (CSI) 
Program shows that the diffusion of residential PV is disproportionally distributed within 
the states’ boundaries where certain areas see more adopters of the technology than 
others.  Figure 1.1 shows the heat map of CSI Program installation depicting the major 




Figure 1.1: Heat map using system installation data from CSI program from 2007 to 
June 30, 2011 showing solar PV installation clusters in California 
This research looks into the PV adoption data from the CSI Program to identify 
and describe some of the factors affecting the patterns of residential PV adoption based 
on spatial-temporal analysis.  Empirically, what are the effects of installation cost and 
existing installed base on the rate of diffusion at the zip code-level. Particularly, I seek to 
understand the impacts of peer effects and third-party owned system on the diffusion of 
residential solar PV in California. California is the leader in residential PV installed 
capacity (Hoen et. al. 2011). As the technology is still in an early stage of market, 
formation, understanding the patterns of adoption in relatively more mature market like 
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California can have broad implications for wider diffusion of the technology at the 
national level.  Identifying the factors influencing the diffusion of residential solar 
photovoltaic in California can provide policy makers and other stakeholders in other 
states some ideas of how the diffusion process might unfold so that they may design 
policy or marketing intervention to speed up the diffusion process.   
1.2 BACKGROUND AND DATA 
1.2.1 Residential Solar PV Incentive Programs 
There are incentive programs at different scales: federal, state, and city level. I 
provide two examples of incentive programs: one at the state level (CA) and the other at a 
city level (Austin) for which there is no state level incentive (TX). 
California Solar Initiative 
Following the “Million Solar Roofs Initiative” which set the goal of one million 
solar homes in California by 2015, the California Solar Initiative (CSI) was established 
by the California Public Utilities Commission in 2006.  The $3.3 billion program was 
designed to greatly expand solar installation in California by 3,000 MW over ten years2.  
The CSI offers a solar rebate program to fund the installation of solar PV on existing 
buildings.  The CSI collects all solar installation applications for the program incentive 
from three investor-owned utilities in the states: Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
(PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E).  
The three main utilities act as program administrators offering rebates to consumers.  The 
California Public Utilities Commission oversees the CSI program. The main focus of the 
                                                
2 California Solar Initiative Annual Program Assessment, California Public Utilities Commission Go Solar 
California Report, June 2009 
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program is on residential and commercial scale installation.  The CSI database includes 
commercial, residential, and non-profit installations.   
Austin Energy Residential Solar PV Program 
In 2003 Austin Energy issued a strategic plan that commits the city to one of the 
country’s most ambitious renewable energy goal of achieving 20% renewable energy 
portfolio standard by 2020.  The Austin city council proposed a strong focus on solar 
energy to achieve this goal.  The plan calls for Austin Energy to commit to a solar rebate 
program for a minimum of ten years and to develop and implement what was the highest 
PV rebate level in the country. The initial budget for solar rebate program in fiscal year 
2004 was set at $933,000. The program does not have a specified end date, but its budget 
is reassessed and approved on an annual basis at the end of fiscal year in October. Table 
1.2 shows the historical budget allocations of Austin Energy solar rebate program for 
fiscal year 2004 – 2009.  The 2003 strategic plan also sets initial solar generating capacity 
goals of 15MW by 2007, 30MW by 2010, 50MW by 2014 and 100MW of solar energy 




Budget for solar PV 
rebates 
2004 $933,000  
2005 $2,000,000  
2006 $3,000,000  
2007 $3,180,000  
2008 $3,000,000  
2009 $4,500 ,000 
Table 1.1: Austin Energy approved annual budget for solar PV rebate 2004-2009. 
                                                
3 Austin Energy Strategic Plan, December 4, 2003. 
 5 
1.2.2 Residential Solar Photovoltaic Adoption Data 
The CSI data is available publicly from the program’s website; data on Austin’s 
adoption was provided by Austin Energy.  Analysis of Austin Energy data is limited to 
773 residential PV systems that were installed from the start of the program in 2004 to 
the end of 2008.  CSI data included in the analysis are from the system with completed 
installed date between 2007 through June 30, 2011. This includes 46188 residential 
systems. Both programs have commercial and residential components; in this thesis I 
focus on the analysis of residential adoption. Both California and Austin dataset contain 
technical characteristics of the system installed (e.g. system rating, inverter and solar 
panel type, and design factor), complete installation date, the total installed cost and the 
final rebate amount awarded. 
1.2.3 Incentive Policies 
California Solar Initiative 
For residential customers, CSI Program rebates vary according to utility territory 
and system performance, which vary according to system size and other installation 
factors.  There are two types of incentives on offered: expected performance-based buy 
down (EPBB) and performance-based incentive (PBI).  The EPBB is an upfront incentive 
based on expected system performance. The rebate is paid in dollars/Watt based on 
system capacity.  The PBI is a five-year monthly payment based on actual performance 
of the system.  The PBI is paid on a fixed dollar/kWh of generation basis.  Systems that 
are greater than 30kW in size are required to apply to the PBI scheme. Smaller system 
owners can elect to opt-in to the PBI scheme. Most residential systems are, however, 
under the EPBB scheme.  Of the 46188 projects in the CSI database used analyzed in this 
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thesis only 3 are PBI4.  Figure 1.2 below shows the rebate “steps” schedule declining 
overtime based on the volume of solar megawatts (MW) with confirmed project 
reservations within utility service territories. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: CSI Program rebate and MW allocation schedule.5 
The rebate step assigned to system owner depends on the confirmed project 
reservation date, which does not necessary fall under one rebate step.  As a result many 
system owners’ total rebate payment were calculated based on two or more rebate steps. 
 
                                                
4 Data includes residential projects that were installed as of June 30, 2011 
5 http://www.gosolarcalifornia.org/csi/rebates.php 
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Table 1.2 shows overtime the rebate level ($/Watt) for the three public utilities 
under the CSI program. 
 
 Rebate Level ($/W) 
Date PGE SCE SDGE 
Jun-07 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Sep-07 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Dec-07 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Mar-08 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Jun-08 2.2 2.5 2.2 
Sep-08 1.9 2.2 2.2 
Dec-08 1.9 2.2 1.9 
Mar-09 1.9 2.2 1.9 
Jun-09 1.9 2.2 1.9 
Sep-09 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Dec-09 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Mar-10 1.55 1.9 1.55 
Jun-10 1.55 1.9 1.1 
Sep-10 1.1 1.9 1.1 
Dec-10 1.1 1.55 0.65 
Mar-11 0.65 1.55 0.35 
Jun-11 0.35 1.1 0.35 
Table 1.2: CSI rebate ($/Watt) level history by quarter for three public utilities in 
California (data from 2007 – 30 June 2011). 
Austin Energy Residential Solar PV Program 
Similar to the CSI program, Austin Energy rebate was offered as an upfront 
incentive based on system capacity in $ per watt.  This initial rebate offering of $5.00 per 
Watt was the highest PV rebate level in the country. The rebate amount is capped at 
$15,000 per annum and $50,000 lifetime limit. In 2009 Austin Energy changed the 
program scheme to performance-based incentive for commercial systems.  Additionally, 
any systems installed in 2010 onward, residential households must meet a set of home 
 8 
energy efficiency requirements in order to qualify for a solar rebate.  Austin Energy 
capacity based rebate level ($/Watt) from 2004 – 2008 are shown in Table 1.3. 
 
Year  Rebate Level ($/Watt)  
2004 $5.00  
2005 $4.50  
2006 $4.00 - $4.50  
2007 $4.50  
2008 $4.50  
Table 1.3: Austin Energy annual rebate level ($/Watt) 2004 - 2008.6 
Federal Investment Tax Credit 
On top of the available incentives at the local or state level, residential solar PV 
owners can also apply for incentives offered by the federal government. The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 provided a federal incentive for residential solar energy projects.  The 
incentive came in the form of investment tax credit (ITC) of 30% of cost after accounting 
for local rebates with a $2000 cap on the total credit that can be claimed by a homeowner.  
The ITC was slated to run between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007 but was 
extended one additional year to December 31, 2008.  The program was further expanded 
when the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 removed the $2000 cap for 
residential solar PV system that is placed in service after January 1, 2009.   The Act also 
extended the ITC until December 31, 2016. 
1.2.4 Installed System Cost 
A survey conducted by Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory7 (LBNL) found 
that the module costs represent about half of the total residential PV installed costs, 
                                                
6 Libby, L. Austin Energy Solar Programs. February 23, 2011. Presentation to University of Texas EST 
Group. 
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material, equipment, and inverter cost make up about 15%, labor represents about 10%, 
and overhead and regulatory compliance make up the remaining cost (Wiser 2009). At 
the project level installed system cost differs based on system size, equipment cost, and 
system design (such as number of inverters and battery-based system).  Module price 
component is susceptible to global market fluctuations and, to an extent, affects system 
costs across markets. Installed system costs may differ across markets as a result of a 
variety of factors, including differences in: incentive policies; interconnection standards; 
labor costs; rebate application process, permitting, and local supply chain. A report by 
LBNL shows a wide range of average installed costs across twenty-two states for system 
smaller than 10kW with the lowest average cost of $6.3/W in New Hampshire to a high 
of $8.4/W in Utah.  The reports found that the two leading PV markets, California and 
New Jersey, are not ranked among states with low-cost; instead, the lowest cost states are 
those with relatively small markets, which illustrate the importance of state and local 
factors in installed system costs  (Wiser 2011). 
National level data shows that from 1999-2010 the average installation cost of 
grid-connected solar PV systems declined by $4.5/W from $12.1/W to $7.6/W for 
systems that are less than 5kW and by $3.3/W for systems in the 5-10 kW in size (Wiser 
2011). California Solar Initiative data also shows that the average system cost has 
decreased over time.  Figure 1.3 shows the average system cost per Watt by quarter for 
CSI program.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
7 LBNL published a series of reports under the title  “Tracking the Sun‟ documenting the trends in installed 
costs of customer sited PV systems on a national level. 
 10 
 
Figure 1.3: Average installed residential system cost ($/Watt) by quarter over the life of 
the CSI program8 
1.2.5 Demographic Data 
Annual demographic data from 2007 and 2009 were obtained from commercially 
available data produced by Environmental Systems Research Institutes (ESRI).  The 
ESRI dataset represents a statistical estimate of population demographics at the ZIP code-
level and includes data on population, age, household characteristics, income, and 
housing. Summary statistics for demographic data for 2007 and 2009 are shown in 
Appendix A. 
1.3 RESEARCH GOALS 
This thesis is an attempt to understand and describe the role of peer effects and 
financial factors in influencing the rate of residential solar PV adoption in California. 
There are two main research goals. The first goal is to assess the influence of system cost 
and peer effects on the rate of diffusion at a zip code-level. Interpersonal networks (peer 
effects) is an important factor that influences an individual’s decision to adopt a new 
                                                
8 http://www.californiasolarstatistics.org/reports/quarterly_cost_per_watt/ 
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technology. Adoption decision depends on the information received from previous 
adopters within the same interpersonal network. Peer effects play a role in the diffusion 
process by spreading information and influencing opinions about new technology. 
Controlling for the differences among zip codes, I create an econometric model to 
estimate the future adoption rate based on cost-to-consumer and existing cumulative 
installed capacity, which is a proxy for peer effects. 
The second goal is to analyze the trends in installation, particularly on the spread 
of third-party owned systems. By analyzing the adoption of residence owned and third-
party own systems (i.e. leased) in six major adoption clusters, I construct descriptive 
statistics of each cluster and attempt to provide some generalizations about market 
expansion as a result of third-party owned business model.  
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided into five chapters.  The next chapter presents literature 
review of diffusion modeling and theories. In Chapter 3 I present an econometric model 
quantifying the effects of installed-base and system costs on the rate of adoption. In 
Chapter 4 I perform cluster analysis of major adoption areas in California and present 
trends and adoption analysis of customer and third-party owned systems.  Chapter 5 





Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Much research attention has been given to explain the process of technology 
diffusion. Early literature and research on the subject were generally presented in a 
descriptive manner. Overtime, analytical models were developed to test the theories 
against empirical data. This chapter presents a brief overview of the most popular 
frameworks for constructing diffusion models as well as provides a discussion on some 
of the important factors in the diffusion of new technologies. 
2.1 TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION MODELS 
The technology s-curve is one of the most widely used models to forecast 
technology diffusion.  The s-curve theory states that in early stage, the rate of technology 
adoption is relatively slow.  The rate of diffusion increases as more people adopt the 
technology.  As the market begins to mature, the rate of adoption decreases and finally 
plateaus as the market saturates.  Figure 2.1 shows the technology diffusion s-curve over 
time.  While a symmetric S-curve is rarely observed in the actual diffusion of a 
technology the S-curve provides a useful framework for studying the diffusion process. 
Two most common models used to describe technology diffusion process are 
epidemic model and probit model (Geroski 2000).  The epidemic model is based on the 
spread of knowledge and information about the new technology.  Under the epidemic 
model the reason why some consumer adopt new technologies later than other is that they 
found out about the innovation later than the earlier adopters.  Therefore, the likelihood 
of adoption is a function of time and the rate of information spread from a source. The 
probit model assesses the adoption decision based from the adopter’s perspective. The 
probit model takes individual’s goals, capabilities, and believes into account whereas the 
epidemic model focuses on the rate of information diffusion (Geroski 2000). This thesis 
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examines the diffusion of residential solar PV from both perspectives. The epidemic 
framework is used to understand the role of peer effects on the spread of the technology 
while the probit model framework is used to understand the adoption decision from the 
customer financial standpoint.  
2.2 INNOVATIVENESS, ADOPTER CLASSES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF EARLY ADOPTERS  
Innovativeness is defined as the degree in which an individual is relatively earlier 
in adopting new ideas than the other members of the society. Adopters of new technology 
can be divided into five different classes: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late 
majority, and laggards.  The theory suggests that these different classes of adopters 
follow a normal distribution curve.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Roger’s five adopter classes and technology s-curve 
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The adopter classes are determined by their differences in socioeconomic status, 
risk aversion, and opinion leadership (Rogers 2003).   Therefore, successful growth of the 
new technology will depend on the transition niche market that appeal to innovators class 
to one in which the early and late majority adopter classes will accept.  The transition 
through these consumer classes also depends on other complementary factors such as 
knowledge about the technology, local suppliers, perceived value, attitudes, and 
interpersonal and social networks (Stern 2000).  
According to Rogers, indicators of early adopters and innovativeness fall under 
three broad categories: socio-demographic, personality values, and communication 
behavior. In socio-demographic terms, they tend to have higher social status, education, 
and degree of social upward mobility.  Socio-demographic variables associated with 
adoption of solar energy technology have been documented in various studies (Durham 
1988, Faiers et. al 2006, McEachern 2008, Rothfield 2010).  
Schelly (2010) modeled residential solar thermal adoption in the United States 
based on three indexes: socio-economic, environmental concerns, and ecological (e.g. 
insolation).  The study found that socio-economic index was the most robust predictor of 
solar thermal technology adoption where areas with higher education levels, low 
unemployment rate, and higher levels of disposable income are more likely to have more 
adopters.  Specific to residential solar PV in California, Rothfield (2010) estimated the 
likelihood of adoption based on consumer characteristics, electricity rates, and the 
number of previous installed systems in a given ZIP code using a probit model.  Drury 
(2012) found correlations between population socio-demographic characteristics and the 
decision to adopt third-party owned solar PV systems in southern California.   
Personality values have not been as widely studies due to difficulties in measuring 
more abstract variables associated with innovativeness such as intelligence, the ability to 
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empathize, attitude toward change, and risk tolerant.  Communication behaviors such as 
social participation, interconnectedness, and opinion leadership are also difficult to 
quantify especially with non-individual assessment level.  
2.3 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS, INFORMATION NETWORKS AND PEER EFFECTS 
In addition to intrinsic consumer characteristics, the decision to adopt also 
depends on contextual factors.  The attitude, context, and behavior theory indicates that 
personal behaviors are more strongly influenced by context than by attitudes or believes.  
The attitude-behavior association is strongest when contextual factors are neutral.  On the 
other hand, when the contextual factors are strongly positive or negative the attitude 
factors on behavior have little impacts (Stern 2000). For example, when a household 
decides to make the decision to installed solar PV the contextual factors such as 
electricity price, available incentives, and ease of finding qualified contractors play a 
more important role than personal environmental concerns. Presumably, where the 
number of adopters is high, the contextual factors associated with adopting the 
technology are positive.   
Two broad contextual factors explored in this thesis are financial and information. 
Financial consideration plays an important role in consumer’s decision to adopt. Faiers 
(2006) found that if consumers do not feel solar technology is superior to their current 
sources of power they are unlikely to adopt based on financial and economic 
considerations. A study conducted by National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL 2009) 
calculates the break-even cost9 for residential PV adoption for utilities service areas in the 
United States where residents in areas with low break-even cost would be less likely to 
adopt the technology due to longer payback time in the investment.  The study found that 
                                                
9 Break-even cost is define as the point where the cost of PV-generated electricity equals to electricity from the grid, as a function of 
electricity price, financing, solar resources, electricity rate structure, and available incentives. 
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customers in states with a combination of high electricity prices and good solar resources 
(e.g. CA and HI) and states with a combination of high electricity prices and incentives 
(e.g. NJ and MA) will be at break-even cost given the installed cost of approximately 
$8/W.  However, the study also noted that the presence of break-even conditions does not 
necessary equate to large consumer adoption of the technology.  Benthem (2007) model 
the economic efficiency of the CSI subsidy policy using consumer choice, learning-by-
doing and environmental externalities as key parameters. For consumer choice 
characteristics they model the diffusion using an S-shape demand curve as a function of 
consumer net present value and diffusion process using logistic growth function to model 
diffusion adjusted each year by the amount of previous year’s adoption. 
Although, the financial considerations greatly affect the decision to adopt, social 
and communication networks are also key determinants in the actions of individuals who 
make up the technological system. Social interactions between previous and potential 
adopters create information networks around the technology that results in peer effects. 
The central assumption of peer effects is that technology diffusion is related to the 
number of previous adopters. Beyond introducing new technology to potential adopters, 
peer effects may increase the speed of diffusion by lowering uncertainties associated with 
new technologies. 
An important barrier to adoption is the uncertainty over the performance of solar 
PV technology.  If the performance of residential PV system is uncertain, then potential 
adopters will perceive the risks associated with owning the system to be high.  According 
to Rogers (2003), people rely on the personal evaluation of the technology by those who 
already adopted. As more people become adopters the observed performance of the 
technology will spread through the networks at a faster pace and further reduce the 
uncertainties associated with owning the technology.  This social learning process and 
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knowledge spillovers reduce the costs and uncertainties associated with residential PV 
technology. The theories on the diffusion of innovation suggest that technology adoption 
(such as the decision to install solar PV) decision is a social process that is influenced by 
previous adopter through interpersonal network exchanges. As such, the diffusion of 
residential solar PV should exhibit some evidence of information network and peer 
effects. 
A number of previous studies on modeling technology adoption have made 
explicit the roles of peer effects in the diffusion process. Two of the most recent studies: 
Narayanan and Nair (2011) measured the peer effects on the sale of hybrid vehicle in 
California using the number of previous adopters. Bollinger and Gillingham (2011) 
identified causal peer effects in the diffusion of solar PV in California using a first-
differenced hazard rate model. 
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Chapter 3: Peer Effects and Cost Factors in Solar PV Diffusion 
This chapter explores the effects of peer influences, financial incentives and 
system cost on the technology adoption rate. Cumulative installed base is used as a proxy 
for peer effects – the higher the installed base the more the impact of peer effects will be. 
I model the rate of residential PV adoption in each zip code based on the cost-to-
customer and the previous cumulative installed capacity and estimate the effects of the 
two variables on new residential PV adoption in California. I also determine whether the 
effects of cost-to-customer and installed base operate differently for zip codes with high 
adoption (installed capacity) and whether these effects change over time. Lastly, I test the 
robustness of the model using geographical variations within California and Austin 
Energy dataset. 
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1 Model Specification 
Spatial analysis of the diffusion rate is limited by the available data. The analysis 
is at the zip-code level because it’s the lowest spatial resolution in the CSI program data. 
As the diffusion profile has strong local characteristics due to factors such as installers, 
potential peer effects and targeted marketing activities by solar companies. Additionally, 
each zip code has different intrinsic characteristics that cannot be observed given the 
limitation of the dataset. Some unobserved heterogeneities include socio-demographic 
characteristics, local government effort to promote residential PV, energy conservation or 
sustainability practice, the present of opinion leaders who advocate PV adoption, and the 
establishment of qualified of local vendors. I use zip code fixed effects model for the 
analysis because it provides insights on individual zip code’s technology diffusion path 
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by allowing for the control for these zip-specific heterogeneities across time; thus, the 
model removes those effects and assesses the net effects of the independent variables (in 
this case cost-to-customer and cumulative installed capacity).  Random effects model 
involving cumulative installed capacity would suffer from misspecification bias since it 
assumes independent and identically distributed unobservables that are uncorrelated with 
installed-based (Narayanan and Nair 2011). 
3.1.2 Technology Adoption Rate 
The rate of adoption is the relative speed with which members of a social system 
adopt an innovation (Rogers 2003).  In diffusion research it is generally measured as the 
number of individuals who adopt an innovation in a given period.  For solar photovoltaic, 
the cumulative installed capacity is generally used as the measure for technology 
diffusion (Shum and Watanabe 2007, Hart, 2009, Rothfield 2010).  Following this 
convention, I model diffusion using cumulative installed capacity and technology 
adoption rate using installed capacity (Watt), not by the number of adopters.  
Further, since there are variations in zip code population, it is necessary to 
normalize the rate of adoption to control for difference in population. In this thesis 
technology adoption rate is defined as the total capacity installed in a given zip code in 
one month normalized by the zip code’s population density.   
The number of owner occupied household was selected as the normalization 
variable as it is likely that the majority of PV installed are in owner occupied single-
family housing unit, the decision to adopt would be made on a household, not individual, 
basis and any financial costs and benefits would be calculated as such. Zip codes where 
number of owner occupied household data is zero or unavailable were excluded from the 
model since the technology adoption rate cannot be normalized. Zip codes that had only 
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one adoption data were excluded from the model due to SAS proc panel procedure 
limitations (SAS was the computational package used for estimating the models).  This 
resulted in 1080 zip codes included in the analysis of the CSI data from 2007 to 30 June 
2011. Figure 3.1 shows the normalized technology adoption rate by zip code from 2007 




Figure 3.1 Technology adoption rate normalized by owner occupied household by ZIP 
code, excluding ZIP codes with technology adoption rate above 100 due to 
low population density. 
3.1.3 Installed base 
Cumulative installed capacity is defined as the total installed capacity based on 










where N is the total number of system installed in month m and qi,n is the system 
capacity (W) installed in zip code i. 
The model assumes that the peer effect resulting from adoption start operating 
once installations are completed and continue to do so in the future periods (Bollinger and 
Gillingham 2011, Iyenger et al. 2011). In the analysis a lag time of three months, Q(i,m-3), 
is used as explanatory variable for cumulative capacity10. 
There are several reasons to use lag term. First, it addresses the endogeneity 
problem. Endogeneity arises when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error 
term. As the installed base in a given period may be correlated with unobserved errors, 
the regression may be bias. Using a lagged term for installed base address this problem 
by shifting the explanatory term so that its correlation with the error term is not 
contemporaneous. While adoption decision is influence by existing installed base, it is 
unlikely to be made contemporaneously with the newest installed system. For example, 
learning by observation of increase number of PV systems may play a role in decision to 
adopt but it is not sufficient. Interpersonal communications are needed in order to reduce 
technology risks and performance uncertainties for potential adopters.  Moreover, the 
effects of cumulative installed capacity should have no immediate effect on the next 
month’s installations due to the long lead-time for system installation. Therefore, a lag 
term is necessary in order to capture the difference between decision-making to when 
actual system is installed on a residence. Lastly, the lag time between existing stock and 
new installation should also prevented autocorrelation between the error term and the 
                                                
10 The median lag time between first confirmed reservation and completed date for CSI data is 4 months. 
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installed base explanatory variable if the duration of any autocorrelation in the errors is 
less than the lag time of three months11. 
3.1.4 Cost-to-Customer 
Recognizing that cost variable is multivariate and endogenous this study adopted 
a simple cost-to-customer calculation based on system size, total cost and available 
incentives. Project installation cost varies by material cost, labor cost and system design, 
which include system size, number of inverters, whether batteries were installed, and 
types of panel.  As the CSI database and data provided by Austin Energy do not have 
sufficient details to capture these variations, total project cost is used in the analysis.  At 
the zip code level, cost reduction may vary due to contractor’s installation experience and 
available supply chain infrastructure.  For example, areas with high adoption rate the cost 
of installation may decrease more rapidly due to learning-by-doing and competitions 
between the installers12. 
The cost-to-customer analysis considers two incentive programs: the local rebate 
program and the federal investment tax credit.  Cost-to-customer is calculated on a $ per 
Watt basis by dividing the difference in total cost and incentives by system size (Watt).  
The amount of local rebate and total system cost for each project is reported in the CSI 
database and Austin Energy dataset.  For all systems, full federal investment tax credit 
was assumed; for systems installed between January 1, 2006 – December 31, 2008 the 
ITC of $2000 was used, 30% ITC of total system cost is used for systems installed after 
January 1, 2009.  There were no federal investment tax credits for systems installed prior 
                                                
11 In their model Bollinger & Gillingham (2011) used completion date as explanatory variable and request 
installation date as the dependent variable to address the autocorrelation problem. 
12 Benthem, Gillingham, and Sweeney (2007) modeled the efficiency of CSI incentive structure based on 
the effects of learning-by-doing. 
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to 2006 (This is applicable only to data from Austin Energy, which goes as far back as 
2004). 
Cost-to-customer prior to January 1, 2006 ($/W) = [(total cost – local 
rebate)]/system size (W) 
Cost-to-customer 2006 – 2008 ($/W) = [(total cost – local rebate) – $2000 ITC] / 
systems size (W) 
Cost-to-customer after January 1, 2009 ($/W) = [(total cost – local rebate) * 0.7] / 
system size (W) 
3.1.5 Level of Aggregation 
The data is aggregated spatially at the zip code level. Zip code was used as the 
unit level analysis for the cross-sectional dimension because it is the finest spatial 
resolution available publicly through the CSI project database.  
Technology adoption rate and installed capacity are aggregated at the monthly 
level. As the residential solar installations were growing at a very rapid rate in California, 
yearly and quarterly aggregation of installations may not provide sufficient detail 
information on the adoption rate given how time varying factors such as rebate rate, 
cumulative installed capacity, and effects of communication networks may influence the 
adoption rate. By increasing the time series component of panel data, monthly time 
aggregation account for the rapid rise in cumulative installed capacity while also 
improving the efficiency of the models’ estimates. As most zip codes do not gain new 
adopters every month, the panel data is unbalanced.   
For cost-to-customer data, I calculated the average cost based on the number of 










Where N is the total number of system installed in quarter q and ci,n is the cost-to-
customer ($/W) for each system installed in zip code i. 
The cost-to-customer is aggregated to zip code–quarter level due to possible 
collinearity with the monthly installed capacity (Narayanan and Nair 2011).  Local 
marketing and sale efforts can change both the cost and new installations during the 
marketing campaign.  For example, a contractor may negotiate lower installation cost for 
customers in the same neighborhood resulting in lower cost-to-customer and higher new 
installations for that month. Aggregating cost-to-customer at quarter level assumes that 
marketing factors vary between quarters but not within quarters (Narayanan and Nair 
2011) and that any effects resulting from changes in system cost do not immediately 
translate into new installation in the next month. 
3.1.6 Models 
The impact of installed base on the rate of adoption varies depending on several 
factors such as increasing demand over time, market size and saturation, and clustering of 
adoption. As these factors cannot be fully controlled in a model, model specification must 
reflect the underlying assumption of how installed base impact the rate of adoption 
overtime. Here I present two models with different assumptions on how the installed base 
(peer effects) can impact the rate of adoption at a zip code level. Model 1 represents the 
assumption of constant marginal impact of peer effects as cumulative installed capacity 
increases. Model 2 assumes increasing impacts of installed base on the rate of adoption.   
Using zip code fixed effects specification and controlling for cost-to-customer and 




log(TAR(i,m)+0.000001) = Ii,m + βC(i,q) + δ*log(Q(i,m-3)+ 0.0000001) + εi,m      (3.1) 
Model 2: 
log(TAR(i,m)) = Ii,m + βC(i,q) + δ*Q(i,m-3) + εi,m              (3.2) 
 
where  Ii is the intercept for zip code i in month m 
TAR(i,,m) is the normalized rate of PV adoption of zip code i in month m 
C(i,q) is the average cost-to-customer installed in zip code i and quarter q 
Q(i,m-3) is normalized total installed capacity in zip code i up to month m-3 
εi,m is the error term 
β and δ are parameters to be estimated 
 
For model 1, the assumption of existing installed base constant marginal effects 
on new adoption is captured by the log specification on cumulative installed base term 
(Bollinger and Gillingham 2011). A small number (0.0000001) is added to the installed 
base term to avoid log error for the early months when cumulative installed capacity is 
zero. 
As the data shows that there are variations in zip code-level cumulative installed 
capacity, I test to see whether the effects of cost-to-customer and installed base operate 
similarly within zip codes that experience high level of adoption.  In order to test this, zip 
codes are divided into two categories, high-zips and rest-of-market.  Zip codes with the 
highest absolute installed capacity are defined as “high zips”; the remaining zip codes are 
defined as “rest-of-market.” There are 1080 zip codes included in the CSI analysis and 
high zip codes are selected based on the their overall rank in the CSI program; for 
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example, high-zips defined at the top 5% level would include the top 54 zip codes with 
highest cumulative installed capacity as of June 30, 2011 and the rest-of-market would 
include the remaining 1026 zip codes. I chose absolute cumulative installed capacity 
instead of cumulative installed capacity normalized by population as the measure of 
adoption level because normalized capacity can be skewed by zip codes with very low 
number of owner occupied household. A binary variable, Z, was created to represent 
high-zips where Z equals 1 for zip codes defined as high-zips and zero for the rest-of-
market zip codes. The high zip code dummy term is interacted with cost-to-customer and 
installed base variable to determine whether there are statistically significant differences 
between the two groups.   
Interaction terms to control for high-zips and rest-of-market zip codes differences 
are included to both models as: 
 
Model 1: 
log(TAR(i,m)) = Iim+ βC(i,q) + δlog(Q(i,m-3)+ 0.0000001) + εI,m + C(i,q)*Z + log(Q(i,m-3)+  
0.0000001)*Z                    (3.3) 
Model 2: 
log(TAR(i,m)) = Iim+ βC(i,q) + δQ(i,m-3) + εI,m + C(i,q)*Z + Q(i,m-3)*Z       (3.4) 
 
3.2 RESULTS 
Table 3.1 presents the results for zip code fixed effects models. Both models show 
significant negative coefficient for cost-to-customer and significant positive coefficient 




  Model 1 Model 2 
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Cost-to-customer -0.08691 <.0001 -0.09012 <.0001 
Installed base 0.011938 <.0001 0.0033 <.0001 
R-Square 0.6221 0.6216 
Table 3.1: Results for zip code fixed effects models. Parameter estimates for cost-to-
customer are for quarterly cost. Parameter estimate for Model 1 installed 
base is for log(normalized cumulative installed capacity + 0.0001). 
Parameter estimate for Model 2 installed base is for normalized cumulative 
installed capacity. 
Model 1 
The coefficient estimate of -0.08691 implies that every $1/W quarterly decrease 
in average cost-to-customer in a quarter leads to approximately 0.09% of the current cost-
to-customer increase in new installed capacity in the next month from the previous 
month’s adoption rate.  This means that the impact of cost-to-customer reduction is 
higher for higher costs (i.e. impact of cost reduction if higher when cost reduces from 
$7/W to $6/W than from $5/W to $4/W). For example, if the average cost-to-customer 
between January – March decreased by $1/W, the rate of adoption in April would 
increase by approximately 0.09% over March’s adoption.  
For zip specific installed base, the model shows significant positive coefficient for 
installed base of 0.011, which translates into an increase of approximately 0.011% for 
every 1% increase per owner occupied household installed capacity increase in a 
respective zip code. This means that if cumulative installed capacity in January were 1% 
higher, that would lead to a 0.011% increase in the rate of adoption in April from the 
previous month’s adoption rate. For example, if the rate of adoption in March were 10 W 
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per household, the April’s rate of adoption resulting from a 1% increase in cumulative 
installed capacity in January would be nearly 10.0011 W per household. 
 
Model 2 
The impacts of decreasing cost-to-customer for both models are similar. Estimate 
for model 2 shows that a $1/W quarterly decrease leads to approximately 0.094% 
increase in the rate of adoption. The estimate impact of installed base on the rate of 
adoption for Model 2 is 0.0033. Due to the assumption of increasing effects of installed 
base, the change in the rate of adoption based on a 1% increase in installed base is 0.33% 
of the cumulative installed capacity not the previous rate of adoption as in Model 1. For 
example, suppose that cumulative installed capacity for a zip code in January is 101 W 
per household (an increase of 1% from 100 W per household in the base case scenario in 
January) the rate of adoption for the month of April would increase by 0.333 W13 per 
household from the rate of adoption in March.  
The results of these two models represent two extreme of the assumption of how 
installed base may impact the rate of adoption. As such the actual magnitude of peer 
effects as estimated by zip code fixed effects is somewhere in between these two model 
estimates14.  
 
                                                
13 The change in adoption rate is a function of cumulative installed capacity multiply by the coefficient 
estimate for installed base. 
14 The models also do not account for certain correlated unobservables that could affect the rate of adoption 
such as localized marketing campaigns. Refer to Bollinger & Gillingham (2011). Peer Effects in the 
Diffusion of Solar Photovoltaic Panels for a study that address the issue using zip-quarter fixed effects. 
Using the same data from CSI database and zip code quarter fixed effects specification; the study found 
that a 1% increase in the zip code’s installed base increases the adoption rate by approximately 1%.  
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Table 3.2 and 3.3 shows the results of the dummy interaction terms model for 
Model 1 (Equation 3.3) and Model 2 (Equation 3.4).  
 
Variables Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
cost-to-customer -0.06178 <.0001 -0.05796 <.0001 
installed base 0.017172 0.0003 0.013944 <.0001 
installed base - high zips 0.035785 <.0001 0.033216 <.0001 
cost-to-customer - high 
zips -0.01721 0.0009 -0.03256 <.0001 
R-square 0.6337 0.636 
High zips definition High zips = top 50 High zips = top 100 
Table 3.2: Results for Model 1 (Equation 3.3) using top 50 and top 100 as high zip 
codes. 
Variables Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
cost-to-customer -0.10909 <.0001 -0.09647 <.0001 
installed base 0.182661 <.0001 0.178922 <.0001 
installed base - high zips 0.006292 <.0001 0.23586 <.0001 
cost-to-customer - high 
zips 0.006412 0.5994 0.037425 0.0004 
R-square 0.6322 0.6392 
High zips definition High zips = top 50 High zips = top 100 
Table 3.3: Results for Model 2 (Equation 3.4) using top 50 and top 100 as high zip 
codes. 
Both models results show that differences between cost-to-customer for high zips 
and rest-of-market are statistically significant for high zip codes defined as top 100 zip 
codes with highest installed capacity.  Interaction term for cumulative capacity are 
significant for both top 50 and top 100 zip codes models.  
Model 1 and 2 points to different effect of cost-to-customer between high and low 
adoption zip codes. For Model 1, the coefficient for cost-to-customer interaction term is 
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negative and significant. This means that customers in high installation zip codes adopt 
the technology at lower cost than those in low adoption zip codes. Conversely, the 
coefficient for the cost-to-customer interaction term for Model 2 is positive suggesting 
that high zip code customers tend to install system at higher average cost for model that 
includes the 100 top zip codes but is not significant for the top 50 zip codes. This result 
does not make sense as the difference between the top 50 zip codes and the rest of the 
market should be more prominent than the difference between the top 100 zip codes and 
the rest of the market. Therefore, if the model for the top 50 zip codes show insignificant 
difference from the rest of the market, it is unlikely that there is a significant difference 
between the top 100 zip codes and the rest of the market. While the effect of decreasing 
cost-to-customer on increasing the overall adoption rate is consistent across all models, it 
is inconclusive whether the there is systematic difference in the cost-to-customer between 
zip codes with the highest adoption level and the rest of the market due to the 
inconsistency of results as discussed above. 
Although the two models provide divergent results for cost-to-customer 
differences, the coefficients for high zip-installed base interaction term are positive and 
significant for both models. To get a better sense of how the effects of installed base may 
vary among zip codes, I ran a successive series of models to compare the installed base 
coefficient estimates for high adoption zip codes and low adoption zip codes.  Instead of 
using dummy variables to determine whether there are statistically differences, I separate 
the data set into to two models: high zips and rest-of-market. High zips models include 
only zip codes that are classified as having high adoption; the remaining zip codes are 
included in rest-of-market models. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 compares installation base 













Top 1% 0.059406 0.011171 
Top 2% 0.056233 0.011171 
Top 3% 0.048166 0.010207 
Top 4% 0.044316 0.009859 
Top 5% 0.046505 0.00911 
Top 10% 0.011937 0.006906 
Table 3.4: Installed base parameter estimates results comparison between high zip 










Top 1% 0.005868 0.003043 
Top 2% 0.008101 0.002526 
Top 3% 0.008278 0.002295 
Top 4% 0.007834 0.002208 
Top 5% 0.008154 0.001863 
Top 10% 0.0033 0.000982 
Table 3.5: Installed base parameter estimates results comparison between high zip 
codes and rest-of-market models for Model 2. 
All models show significant positive coefficient for the installed base.  The 
coefficient estimates for the top tier zip codes are higher than rest-of-market models 
suggesting higher social connectivity within these zip codes. 
3.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
In this section, I conducted a set of robustness checks for the model. The first set 
of tests leverage the richness of CSI data by varying the geographical granularity of the 
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analysis. I modeled subsets of CSI data at different levels of geographical boundary. The 
premise for this is installed base effects get weaker as the geographical boundary of 
analysis expands. I ran a set of models at the utility, county, and city levels using the 
same methodology as the entire state model. The estimates are reported in Table 3.6. 
 
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Cost-to-customer -0.06977 <.0001 -0.08257 <.0001 -0.0756 0.0275 
Installed based 0.012384 <.0001 0.019638 <.0001 0.027822 <.0001 
Geography PG&E  Santa Clara County San Jose 
Number of zip 
codes 597 51 29 
R-Square 0.6536 0.4885 0.4557 
       
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Cost-to-customer -0.11571 <.0001 -0.13492 <.0001 -0.08547 0.129 
Installed based 0.007264 <.0001 0.016567 <.0001 0.027871 0.0058 
Geography SCE Orange County Huntington Beach 
Number of zip 
codes 405 80 4 
R-Square 0.5251 0.4659 0.1337 
       
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Cost-to-customer -0.13411 <.0001 -0.1394 <.0001 -0.16087 <.0001 
Installed based 0.022831 <.0001 0.023698 <.0001 0.024619 <.0001 
Geography SDGE San Diego County San Diego 
Number of zip 
codes 104 91 42 
R-Square 0.5389 0.5422 0.5115 
Table 3.6: Parameter estimates results for utility, county, and city level models for 
Model 1. The top part of the Table shows robustness test for the PG&E 
territory. The middle part of the table shows robustness test for SCE 




The results in Table 3.6 replicate the analysis in Model 1 (Equation 3.1) but with 
smaller geographical boundaries. The rational for running the model at successively 
smaller geographical boundary is to test the estimate of installed base. As peer effects 
operates at a local level, it is expected that model that includes smaller geographical areas 
would produce higher coefficient estimate for installed base than models that cover larger 
area. In other words, peer effects should become stronger as we reduce our area of 
analysis. As shows in Table 3.6 above the coefficient estimates for installed base increase 
as the geographical areas decrease (from left column to right column).  
Cities included in Table 3.6 are those with relatively higher cumulative installed 
capacity. It is likely that the models consisting of cities with few adoptions will produce 
lower estimates. I selected cities with high adoption for this analysis in order to support 
earlier finding that installed base effects are greater in high adopter zip codes. Results 
reported in Table 3.4 and 3.5 above have already provided evidence to this hypothesis. 
Results from models at city level further point to higher peer effects within these 
communities.  
Table 3.7 reports the second robustness check using independent data set from 
Austin Energy. 
 
  Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| R-Square 
Cost-to-customer -0.03956 0.0108 -3.67 0.0003   
Log installed base (3 months lag) 0.006994 0.00306 2.28 0.0229 0.5635 
Table 3.7: Parameter estimates results for all Austin data 
Replicating the methodology and analysis from CSI models, the result is 
presented in Table 3.7. Estimate results from the Austin model compare favorably with 
estimates from CSI models.  The cost-to-customer show negative significant relationship 
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with rate of adoption.  Significant positive coefficient for installed base is also within the 
same range as CSI models.   
Robustness check for Model 2 shows similar results as Model 1 above. Complete 
robustness check results for Model 2 are presented in Appendix B. 
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Chapter 4: Consumer Discount Rate and the Expansion of Third-Party 
Owned Systems 
This chapter explores the effects of third-party owned (i.e. leased) model* in 
opening up residential PV market to new adopters. As elaborated below, evidence from 
major adoption clusters in California show that growth in leasing adoption exhibits 
exponential characteristics while growth of customer owned system, shows a linear 
growth overtime.  
4.1 DISCOUNT RATE AND CONSUMER DEMAND FOR RESIDENTIAL SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC 
The three major barriers in the decision to purchase residential solar PV are high 
up-front cost, long payback time, and uncertainties associated with the long-term 
performance of the technology (Margolis et.al. 2006). At the time of adoption, potential 
adopters face an intertemporal choice of trading off between high upfront cost and the 
benefits that pay off over time. One prominent theory in characterizing consumer’s 
behavior in such decision is the discounted-utility (DU) model proposed by Paul 
Samuelson (1937). The theory postulates that under an ideal condition a consumer’s 
rational decision on intertemporal choice can be measured and described by a constant 
parameter, the discount rate. Under this simplified framework, consumer discount rate 
associated with residential solar PV can be broken down into two categories based on the 
adoption barriers – financial discount rate (that associated with the purchasing capability 
of the potential adopter) and information discount rate. 
The net present value (NPV) is commonly used in appraising the value of capital 
investments. A simple NPV of a residential solar PV system is calculated based on the 
costs of the system and future savings resulting from the reduction in energy bills. 
                                                
* In this chapter the terms third-party owned and leased systems are used interchangeably 
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Discount rate is applied to the expected benefits to determine the present value of future 
cash flow. The lower is discount rate, the higher the NPV and the more attractive solar 
PV installation become financially. To an extent, the financial discount rate is specific to 
each consumer who has a unique reaction to a given price depending on his or her beliefs 
and financial situations. Previous studies have shown that consumer’s discount rate 
associated with energy durable goods vary inversely with income (Hausman 1979, Gately 
1980).  
Benthem, Gillingham, and Sweeney (2007) calculated the NPV based on subsidy 
policies, expected savings, maintenance costs, and other technical data of a “typical” 
system for a solar customer in California. They then modeled the overall consumer 
demand for solar PV as a function of NPV, market size, and diffusion overtime and 
showed that demand has grown with the increase in NPV of a system. In this model, the 
diffusion component indicates that demand increases as more systems are installed and 
consumers become more familiar with the technology (Benthem, et. al. 2007).  
This suggests that the information component of the discount rate is a function of 
the installed base. This component captures the technology risks and performance 
uncertainties. If a consumer has limited knowledge about residential solar PV systems, he 
or she cannot anticipate what the costs and savings associated with owning the system 
will be. This is equivalent to saying that their information discount rate is high. In an area 
where there is high installed base of solar, consumers are more likely to be able to engage 
with previous adopters and gain more knowledge and familiarity with the technology. In 
so far as the diffusion is low, consumer’s information discount rate will remain high.  
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4.2 THE EFFECT OF THIRD-PARTY OWNED MODEL ON CONSUMER DISCOUNT RATE 
Presumably, the leasing model reduces, if not completely eliminates, the 
information component of a potential adopter’s discount rate. Thus, once the leasing 
option is made available to customer, the net present value associated with adoption 
under third-party ownership is largely determined by the expected future savings from 
electricity generated on-site and consumer’s financial discount rate. Third-party PV 
companies install and operate solar PV system on the customer’s premises. The 
companies maintain ownership of the systems and let the customer either lease the 
system at a fixed monthly cost or buy the electricity produced by the system thorough a 
power purchase agreement (PPA). Under these arrangements, third-party ownership can 
reduce or eliminate the upfront cost of installation; thus, changing the NPV of system 
adoption. By removing the high capital requirement, third-party systems make adoption 
possible to a new set of customer who may have been unwilling or unable to finance a 
system purchase. 
Information discount rate is essentially eliminated with the leasing model. Since 
the systems are owned and operated by the companies, customers are unburdened from 
any system repair and maintenance costs. Third party ownership allow customer to take 
advantage of solar PV benefits while avoiding the technology risks. The leasing model 
has an effect of lowering the overall discount rate, thus increasing the net present value of 
residential PV adoption. 
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between net present value and adopter population under a 
normal distribution assumption 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between NPV and the number of potential 
adopters. Assume that under a normal population distribution the NPV associated with 
system purchase is located at NPVb. The blue shaded area represents the population who 
are able to adopt the technology at that NPV due to a combination inherently high 
individual’s financial and information discount rates. I emphasize that the leasing option 
reduces the discount rate by an amount that increases the NPV for adoption to a higher 
NPVl. The difference between NPVb and NPVl significantly expands the number of 
potential adopters as shown by the larger shaded area in red. This increased adopter 
population is exponential so we should expect an exponential growth in the leasing of PV 
system. 
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4.3 THIRD-PARTY SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA  
In August 2008, the California State Assembly passed a legislation exempting 
third-party PV solar companies from Public Utilities Commission’s (PUC) regulatory 
authority. Prior to the ruling, third-party solar PV companies faced regulatory uncertainty 
on the use of the PPA model since under the previously existing law any entity that sold 
electricity to residential utility customer was required to register with the PUC and be 
regulated as an electric corporation. PUC regulatory requirements would add compliance 
and administrative costs to the companies making the PPA business model less 
economically attractive. The law created an exception for third-party owners of solar 
generation from being defined electrical corporations. At the end of 2008, share of third-
party owned system was around 7.5% of the market in California, by the end of second 
quarter 2011, third-party systems made up about 20% of the residential PV capacity 
installed in California.  
 
4.4 CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, analysis of adoption treads is conducted at a cluster level. Here a 
cluster is defined as an area within 30 miles radius of a major adoption city. Cluster-level 
analysis is used to control for any geographical distance factors that may contribute to 
differences in adoption trends and characteristics such as timing of adoptions and system 
sizes. The left heat-map in Figure 4.2 shows the cumulative installed capacity of 
residential solar PV and the locations of adoption clusters analyzed in this chapter. The 
heat-map on the right shows the cumulative installed capacity of third-party systems in 
California. Cluster-level installations are summarized in Table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.2: Left - Heat map of system installations and locations of adoption clusters as 
defined in this work.  












San Jose 29410 4.15 7150 
San Diego 24560 4.35 4898 
L.A. 19590 3.98 5821 
Fresno 12230 5.43 2256 
Sacramento 10003 4.66 2153 
Bakersfield 5520 5.49 1006 
Table 4.1: Adoption summary for San Jose, San Diego, Los Angeles, Fresno, 
Sacramento, and Bakersfield clusters. 
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4.5 TRENDS IN SYSTEM ADOPTIONS 
Figures 4.3 – 4.8 plot the cumulative installed capacity of customer-owned (i.e. 
“bought”) systems overtime in the different adoption clusters identified in Figure 4.2 and 
Table 4.1. The horizontal axis shows the date in which installations were completed and 
the vertical axis shows the cumulative installed capacity in kW. Installed system sizes are 
broken down into 0-3 kW, 3-5 kW, 5-7 kW, 7-9 kW, and larger than 9 kW categories to 
show the system size preferences of adopters in each clusters. 
 
 








































Figure 4.4: Growth of customer-owned systems by system size in Fresno. 
 


































































Figure 4.6: Growth of customer-owned systems by system size in Bakersfield. 
 



































































Figure 4.8: Growth of customer-owned systems by system size in San Diego. 
Figures 4.3 - 4.7 illustrate the systematic property in the growth of adoption for 
customer-owned systems. In every cluster, except San Diego (Figure 4.8), growths of 
adoption for all system size categories display strongly linear characteristics with growth 
rate remaining relatively constant through out the study period.  
The exponential growth characteristic in San Diego cluster is an anomaly in the 
analysis. While other clusters such as Los Angeles and Sacramento show some evidence 
of exponential growth for certain size systems, the overall adoption profiles are generally 
linear. A possible explanation for the discrepancy in the San Diego cluster is related to 
the CSI MW rebated allocated to each utility service territory. The CSI rebate level 
decreases in step when a certain MW target is reached. The MW targets vary according to 




































Under this scheme, a utility with smaller allocation of MW will move through the rebate 
steps faster than the others even though they may experience relatively similar rate of 
adoption. Table 4.2 shows the MW available for each step by utility territory. The 
shading are in Table 4.2 show the current step as of April 30, 2012. 
 
 MW Allocation in Step 
Rebate 
Step PG&E SCE SDG&E 
1 0 0.1 0 
2 10.1 10.6 2.4 
3 14.4 15.2 3.4 
4 18.7 19.7 4.4 
5 23.1 24.3 5.4 
6 27.4 28.8 6.5 
7 31 32.6 7.3 
8 36.1 38 8.5 
9 41.1 43.3 9.7 
10 50.5 53.1 11.9 
Table 4.2: CSI program incentive MW available by step and utility territory.15 
As shown in Table 4.2 above, SDG&E has the lowest MW allocated for its 
customers. San Diego cluster is served by San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) while the 
other five clusters are served by either Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) or Southern 
California Edison (SCE). A hypothesis to why San Diego cluster has a different growth 
profile than other clusters is that third-party solar PV companies chose to focus their 
efforts on the bigger markets (PG&E and SCE) as they can install more systems at higher 
rebate levels than in SDG&E territory. One other possible reason is that since the rebate 
steps are changing quickly relative to the other two utilities, the scarcity of available 
                                                
15 http://www.csi-trigger.com/dataAnnex.aspx 
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incentives shortens the decision-making time for customers in SDG&E territory resulting 
in faster diffusion profile. 
In contrast to the linear characteristics of customer-owned systems, third-party 
owned installations exhibit exponential growth rate in all clusters. Figure 4.9 – 4.14 show 
the growth in adoption for third-party owned systems. 
 
 




































Figure 4.10:  Growth of third-party owned systems by system size in Fresno. 
 








































































Figure 4.12: Growth of third-party owned systems by system size in Bakersfield. 
 




































































Figure 4.14: Growth of third-party owned systems by system size in San Diego. 
In every cluster, third-party installations began growing rapidly after 2008, which 
coincide with the legislative action classifying third-party solar companies as non-electric 
corporations (see Section 4.3). Growths for most system size categories show strong 
exponential trends compared to growths of customer-owned systems. The systematic 
difference as compared with customer-owned systems illustrates how the third-party 
owned model has opened up the market for new potential adopters.  
The reasons are twofold. First, third-party option makes adoption more financially 
attractive to a much larger population of potential adopters. Second, to a smaller extent, 
peer effects associated with third-party adoption may have broader consequence than 



































With regard to the first reason, recall from Figure 4.1, the number of potential 
adopters increases rapidly as the NPV of adoption move to the right along the population 
density curve. The normal distribution function is represented by: 
 
where σ is the standard deviation and µ is the mean, which is located at the peak 
of the distribution. The exponential term increases as x moves toward the mean. Thus, for 
every unit increase in NPV, the portion of the population for which NPV is positive for 
adopting PV increases exponentially, resulting in larger market expansion. 
4.6 INSTALLED BASE AND PEER EFFECTS 
As previously discussed, third-party option eliminates the technology risks for 
consumers. To the extent that interpersonal networks play a role in adoption decision, the 
conversations between potential leased systems adopter and previous adopters of the 
systems would focus more on the financial benefits of the technology, which are 
immediate and quantifiable (monthly savings) rather than technology risks. On the other 
hand, potential adopters who are considering system purchase need to seek out 
information on technology performance, which include unpredictable and costly elements 
such as system breakdown and inverter replacement. For leaser, uncertainties in system 
performance are further reduced as third-party solar contractors generally provide the 
estimated savings for consumer prior to installation. Consequently, the search cost 
associated with third-party system adoption is much lower consisting of mostly financial 
information. The interactions between would be leaser and previous adopters are 
shallower making the peer effects spread quicker as potential adopters have less reliance 
on the experiences of previous adopters beyond the basic introduction to the technology.  
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4.7 INCOME AND SYSTEM SIZE 
Presumably within a limited geographic area people who own larger homes are 
more affluent. For example, they may have higher household income or greater access to 
capital to afford the higher mortgage. As the system size is generally limited physically 
by the space available to accommodate solar panels it follows that larger solar PV 
systems are installed in bigger houses. In so far as these assumptions hold, system size 
can be used as a proxy for income distribution within a cluster. 
Figures 4.15 – 4.18 plot the ratio of third-party capacity to total installed capacity 
over time for San Jose, Fresno, Bakersfield, and San Diego clusters. The x-axis shows the 
completion dates and the y-axis shows the ratio of cumulative third-party owned capacity 
and the total cumulative installed capacity (customer-owned and third-party system). The 
ratio represents the market penetration of third-party owned model in the solar PV 
market. 
 
































Figure 4.16: Third-party systems market penetration in Fresno. 
 
































































Figure 4.18: Third-party systems market penetration in San Diego. 
Figure 4.15 – 4.18 show the market penetration of third-party owned system 
broken down by system size. These results show an increasing market share for all 
system size categories across every cluster. Given that third-party owned systems provide 
greater affordability (by increasing NPV), we should expect that population associated 
with lower income demographics would opt to adopt a lease system. If leased systems are 
adopted mostly by people with lower income, then the market penetration for third-party 
owned systems should be higher for smaller size systems. However, with one 
exception16, the results show no systematic bias toward smaller system sizes. 
                                                
16 One exception where larger houses show a preference for buying is in the San Jose cluster (Figure 4.15) 
where system 7-9 kW size category has lower market penetration.  In Fresno cluster (Figure 4.16) the 
smallest system size category (0-3 kW) market penetration shows that smaller home in this area has a 

































Although one of the main premises for the growth of third-party owned system is 
that it reduces the financial discount rate for potential adopters that lead to greater 
affordability for population associated with lower income demographics, the results show 
no systematic bias toward smaller system size. This suggests that there is no specific 
relationship between income demographics and market penetration of third party 
systems. 
Plots for Los Angeles and Sacramento clusters are shown in Appendix C. 
 
4.8 POLICY IMPLICATION 
Third-party owned systems were adopted prior to PUC ruling on the exemption of 
third-party solar companies from being regulated as electric corporation. Due to this 
regulatory uncertainty, third-party owned systems installation remained relatively 
stagnant while customer-owned systems experienced sustained growth. Our analysis of 
the installation trends show third-party systems growing exponentially and gaining 
market share soon after the regulatory barrier was removed in August 2008. Third-party 
business model reduces financial and technology-related barriers for consumers thus, 
expanding the solar PV market into a significantly larger population base. Consequently, 
policies that remove non-market barriers discouraging third-party solar PV companies 
from competing in the market have a potential to expedite and expand solar PV adoption. 
Various states have found legislative and regulatory solutions around the issue. However, 
barriers remain in regions around the country specifically in areas where electricity 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In this thesis I developed a spatial-temporal model that estimates the peer effects 
and cost drivers in the diffusion of solar PV at the zip-code level.  The results reveal 
significant and positive installed base effects in the rate of future adoption. The cost-to-
customer reduction is negative and significant at the state level. The impact of peer 
effects in inducing new adoption is larger in zip codes with higher overall adoptions. 
In the second part of the thesis I documented systematic patterns in the growth of 
residential solar PV adoption in different markets in California. The exponential 
characteristics in the growth of third-party systems point to a market expansion into a 
new set of potential adopters. Increase market share of third-party owned adoptions in all 
system sizes suggest no underlying differences in income demographic between 
residence-owned and third-party owned adopters. Rather, our results suggest that the 
“new adopters” unleashed on the leasing model had higher information costs (associated 
with technology risk) for the bought model. But as the leasing model eliminates those 
costs almost entirely, these potential adopters become activated and ready for adoption. 
Future Research 
As peer effects occur because of several factors, social learning arising from 
increased installed base may be complimented by social norms such as environmental 
concerns and image motivations. Estimation of installed based component of peer effects 
can be improved by controlling for the presence of prescriptive social influences.  
Analysis of consumer discount rate points to the importance of third-party owned 
model in the expansion of solar PV market. Further work to explore the growth of third-
party owned systems in other markets (e.g. commercial customer and other regions) may 
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also provide insights into quantifying the impacts of third-party companies in the 














Results of robustness check for zip code fixed effects Model 2. 
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Cost-to-customer -0.06741 <.0001 -0.07939 <.0001 -0.04386 0.0202 
Installed based 0.003855 <.0001 0.004202 <.0001 0.01812 <.0001 
Geography PG&E  Santa Clara County San Jose 
Number of zip 
codes 597 51 29 
R-Square 0.6545 0.4807 0.471 
       
       
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Cost-to-customer -0.12415 -0.12415 -0.12973 <.0001 -0.11152 -0.11152 
Installed based 0.001483 0.001483 0.020527 <.0001 0.031781 0.031781 
Geography SCE Orange County Huntington Beach 
Number of zip 
codes 405 80 4 
R-Square 0.5238 0.4872 0.1426 
       
       
  Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Cost-to-customer -0.13894 <.0001 -0.14428 <.0001 -0.17036 <.0001 
Installed based 0.006558 <.0001 0.00621 <.0001 0.004319 <.0001 
Geography SDGE San Diego County San Diego 
Number of zip 
codes 104 91 42 
R-Square 0.537 0.5389 0.5008 
Table B.1: Parameter Estimates Results for utility, county, and city level models 
for Model 2. 
  Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| R-Square 
Cost-to-customer -0.04262 0.0108 -3.93 <.0001   
Installed base 0.005702 0.00189 3.01 0.0027 0.5671 
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